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F A C U L T Y  V I E W S
As usual, my colleague Jim White has hit many nails on many heads. Also as usual, however, I’m going to be a pain and part 
ways with him a bit.
First, was Chrysler’s bankruptcy “suspicious” in its use of section 
363 of the Bankruptcy Code? You bet. Leaving aside the 
proliferation of 363 sales to swallow Chapter 11 as we once knew 
it, Chrysler was out in left field. Not only was it a “sale” of 
everything meaningful in the company, it was to a seller—Fiat—
that put in no money. (To be fair, Fiat agreed to contribute 
technological know-how on cars that Americans will now be much 
more interested in buying than they were in a pre-financial 
collapse environment.)
And GM was even weirder: Not only did the government put up all 
the purchase money, but the purchaser wasn’t even a foreign car 
maker with a plausible contribution of sweat equity; it was “new 
GM,” a legal creation. GM bought its economic self from its former 
self for no money down, all at the underwriting of the government. 
So yes, that’s “deviant,” even worse than Professor White lets on.
But why the deviance? Was it to mask a nefarious government 
plan of wealth redistribution? Before we analyze the propriety of 
the government’s conduct, we must consider why it got involved in 
the first place. And to do that, we have to understand basic 
business reorganization financing. In a regular reorg, companies 
turn to a now thick and sophisticated market of so-called DIP 
lenders who provide funds to reorganizing “debtors-in-
possession,” as the struggling companies are called in the 
Bankruptcy Code. In a regular Chapter 11, you’d call up commercial 
lender CIT Group and ask for a multimillion dollar DIP loan (which, 
rest assured, gets highly favorable treatment in bankruptcy law, so 
don’t worry about the DIP lender’s risk). Thus, free marketeers 
would say, “Fie on public intervention!  Let the auto companies 
fend for themselves, get a DIP loan, if they can, and reorganize the 
same way anyone else would have to in Chapter 11.”
In the abstract, not an unfair point. But there was a problem, and 
it was twofold. First, the car companies were huge and so needed 
DIP loans that would be amongst the largest ever in bankruptcy 
(orders of magnitude beyond the traditional case). Not 
unprecedented, to be sure, but the size of loans that would need 
at the very least a syndicate of banks to cobble together the funds. 
Second, and more importantly, they needed the money in the 
midst of a financial collapse of the lending markets. (By the way, 
anyone see how that great DIP lender CIT Group fared?) So even 
the starchiest libertarian would grumblingly concede that if there’s 
a time for public intervention into the DIP loan market, this would 
probably be it.  It was a bold decision, but one that I believe will 
be eventually vindicated economically. It’s not surprising that Mr. 
Rattner’s Fortune article (see Professor White’s article) recounts a 
4–4 deadlock of advisers confronting the President in deciding 
whether to intervene with a loan.
Now the tricky part: You decide as a policy matter the feds should 
step in and provide a DIP loan to the failing auto giants. How do 
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F A C U L T Y  V I E W S
you do that without nationalizing them? You do what they did: 
Appoint an ad hoc task force with negotiating authority and 
headed up by real financers, not government bureaucrats. They 
drove hard bargains. They took an equity stake, because there’s 
only so much debt financing you can tolerate in a reorg with this 
capital structure. And they decided to do it through 363 presumably 
for the reasons most 363 sales occur: for speed. (And speedy 
these reorgs were—in and out in a month.) Viewed thus, the 363 
sale structure had nothing to do with masking redistribution goals; 
it was driven by bankruptcy reorganization strategy.
Now we judge in hindsight. Did they drive too hard a deal with 
certain parties? Were they too soft with others? Maybe. Let’s start 
with the secureds. Were the feds too hard on them, knocking $6 
billion down to 2? (Let me be clear, I am assuming a proactive role 
of the government as negotiator because, as with all DIP lenders, 
they set the terms of when they’ll be willing to lend; so yes, they 
get to set financial conditions.) I could try to weasel on this and 
point to the consent of the trustee representing the consortium of 
secured lenders, which bound the others, but Professor White 
rightly raises the enthusiasm with which some of the TARP-
recipient secured lenders might have wanted to help out the 
government by being especially conciliatory.
The real question is: Are the assets encumbered by those lenders’ 
liens worth more than the $2 billion? No, as far as I’m aware, and 
certainly no one tried to make a valuation argument—common in 
bankruptcy litigation—to the contrary. In fact, some pundits 
opined that $2 billion was generous, especially in the liquidation 
scenario that would unfold absent government financing. (As a 
sidebar, I disagree with Professor White and some courts that 
suggest a secured creditor could insist on payment of the face 
amount of the liens—more than $6 billion—to block a 363 sale. 
I’m in the camp that reads the Code to say if $2 billion is all the 
encumbered assets are really worth, that’s all a secured creditor 
can expect in a 363 sale.)
In all the gnashing of teeth that was the 
appellate litigation (including brief 
Supreme Court stays) trying to block the 
363 sale, there was plenty of hand-waving 
to alleged bias, sub rosa end runs around 
Chapter 11 through 363, and statutory 
interpretations of section 363. But there 
was never a good, meaty argument that 
$2 billion was not a fair valuation of the 
secured creditors’ assets. As such, I weep 
nary a tear for the purportedly aggrieved 
dissenting secureds.
The better raising of eyebrows comes 
from the treatment of the UAW as an 
unsecured creditor. Here, it ended up with 
a relatively handsome stake in new 
Chrysler (and GM for that matter). I don’t 
agree that they got a $4 billion gift; at best they received a 
disproportionately favorable stake in the new company. To this 
charge of favoritism there is a technical argument of exquisite 
legal positivism and there’s a better answer. The technical answer 
is that “new” Chrysler can distribute its capital structure however 
it likes, and so, for example, the Bankruptcy Code’s command of 
equal treatment of unsecured creditors is inapposite (in contrast to 
a proposed restructuring under a Chapter 11 plan). That explanation 
is not likely to satisfy skeptics of why this was a 363 sale in the 
first place; in fact, it will infuriate them and prove their underlying 
mistrust.
The better answer is that even the Bankruptcy Code allows 
departure from the  injunction if the creditors are uniquely situated. 
Here, there is a plausible argument that the union-creditor is 
differently situated: One needs a happy union to continue making 
cars at maximal efficiency, and it is not a far stretch to imagine 
labor unrest scuttling any hopes for economic survival. Thus, even 
if they had to defend the capital structure—which the positivists 
would not concede—there’s a decent argument to rest behind 
that this favoritism was perfectly appropriate (although Professor 
White might brand it a mere fig leaf).
The $64,000 question is how much value added the union 
contributed vis-à-vis the other creditors, and how does one 
commensurate that into a premium in terms of the stake in the 
new company? I don’t have an answer to that, nor do I have a 
strong feeling whether a Republican-led auto task force (assuming 
it embraced the policy threshold whether to lend DIP money in the 
first place) would have come to strikingly different amounts. I’m 
not so wet behind the ears that I envision no labor solicitude from 
a task force emanating from this administration, but I’m also not 
sure how much of an effect it actually had. I don’t think it was 
tantamount to a $4 billion giveaway. (More thought is devoted by 
Professors Roe and Skeel in an upcoming issue of the Michigan 
Law Review.)
The big picture question for me was on 
which side of the divide did this fall: a 
government nationalization of heavy-
handed policy guiding, or a reluctant 
intervention of capital by the ultimate 
lender of last resort? Contrary to popular 
rumor, Representative Barney Frank did 
not get to dictate which plants shut 
down, and I don’t think the President 
was very involved in picking Fritz 
Henderson’s replacement at the helm of 
GM. The jury’s still out, but history may 
well judge this as restrained government 
intervention in a time of financial crisis 
that enhanced, not undermined, capital 
markets.
